As the American people ask themselves which presidential candidate has the best plan for Iraq, they should consider the transformation of Anbar province. Few areas in Iraq better illustrate both the immense potential of continued U.S. engagement and the importance of tailoring that involvement to events on the ground. With relatively low-cost U.S. support, Anbar could emerge as a bulwark against the creation of an al-Qaeda safe haven in Iraq. However, only a long-term commitment that reflects the complex situation in Anbar has any chance of success.
Anbar’s importance lies in its population and location, which make it the best place for Sunni-dominated al-Qaeda to establish a sanctuary in Iraq. Anbar is the former heart of the Sunni insurgency, accounting for about one-third of U.S. deaths in Iraq until last year despite having only about four percent of the total population. Home to military officers from Saddam’s regime, Anbar has a ready pool of proficient fighters. Smuggling routes from Syria can bring in arms, money, and foreign terrorists. The overwhelming Sunni Arab composition of Anbar and its remoteness from Shiite areas allow al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to train and plan attacks instead of constantly combating hostile Shiites. Unsurprisingly, AQI declared Ramadi in Anbar the capital of its “Islamic State of Iraq” in 2006.
The terrorist group, however, overplayed its hand. In its attempt to impose its tyrannical vision of Islam, AQI killed local leaders and innocent civilians. With the promise of U.S. support, the tribes in Ramadi turned on AQI in late 2006. This “Awakening” movement soon spread to other areas. U.S. forces set up forward outposts to protect the populace and allowed tribal members to police their neighborhoods. The tribal resurgence and the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy proved the perfect storm.
Anbar, comprising a third of Iraq’s territory, has undergone the most radical security transformation in the country. During 2007, attacks per week in the province dropped by 90 percent. Since October 2007, on average less than three U.S. service members have died each month in Anbar, out of the roughly 35,000 U.S. troops there. Military convoys now allow civilian vehicles to pass them on the road, a previously inconceivable policy due to the threat of car bombs.
#ad#Moreover, this dramatic turnaround is looking durable. Even after the assassination of its charismatic leader, the Awakening movement remains strong. Security has been maintained after the departure of U.S. troops. “Surge” units left back in September 2007 and U.S. troops have drawn down in Ramadi. Even more dramatic troop withdrawals are being discussed now.
Anbar is also defying those who are suspicious of the tribes’ motivations and ability to manage their rivalries. The tribes are settling their differences peacefully, forming a unified political party for upcoming provincial elections. The province’s rejection of AQI, a logical ally for Sunnis if they want to fight Shiites, indicates that Anbaris are not planning on waging civil war.
However, the situation in Anbar is less than perfectly stable. An increasing intra-Sunni rivalry threatens to derail upcoming provincial elections. The Iraqi Islamic party, the Sunni party that currently dominants the provincial government, is jockeying for position with the upstart Awakening movement. The Iraqi Islamic Party is now trying to delay the scheduled U.S. handover of security to the Iraqis because it is seen as favoring the Awakening movement and its allies in the police. Meanwhile, the central government is still distrustful of the Anbar tribes. Baghdad has been slow in providing critical economic development and integration of Anbaris into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), risking renewed violence by alienating the province.
This complex situation requires the United States to have a long-term strategy in Anbar. Baghdad must ensure that fair provincial elections take place on schedule. Anything less risks intra-Sunni violence, which AQI would be keen to exploit. The Iraqi government must also increase its support to Anbar. The province deserves the benefit of the doubt due to the great danger it has faced for being the first Sunni Arab province to reject AQI. Moreover, ISF training does not greatly increase the capabilities of already proficient and well-armed former insurgents. Putting Anbaris on the government’s payroll actually ties them to Baghdad.
Washington can pressure Baghdad to take these actions, using its massive assistance to the Iraqi government as leverage. U.S. forces can also help reduce the distrust between Anbaris and Baghdad by providing a more neutral security presence while the ISF matures and provincial control is transferred to Iraqis. In the long term, U.S. forces can train the ISF, facilitate economic development and a peaceful political process, and help ensure that the populace remains protected from AQI, as long as Iraqis approve of such a role.
Due to the combination of high strategic pay-off (no al-Qaeda safe haven) and low cost (few troops and low casualties), Anbar is a unique opportunity that cannot be squandered. While an open-ended U.S. commitment to the Iraqi government may not be the answer if Baghdad continues to delay taking action, neither is a timetable for withdrawal that ignores the ever-changing facts on the ground. The same could be said for the rest of Iraq. One can only hope that both presidential candidates’ plans end up reflecting this reality.
— Erik Swabb served in Anbar, Iraq as a Marine infantry officer from September 2004 to March 2005. 
