The Iraqi government’s battle against Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi army in Basra is playing in the U.S. as a blow to progress in the war over the last year. But viewed from the perspective of recent Iraqi history, it is a welcome development. It used to be that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki blocked U.S. forces from taking on Sadr’s militia in Baghdad, and it was a plausible fear that Sadr would take over Iraqi security forces from within. Now, Iraqi security forces have been directly battling the “outlaw” elements of Sadr’s army and al-Maliki compares Shia “gangs” to al-Qaeda: “It’s unfortunate that we used to say these very words about al-Qaeda, when all the while, there were people among us who are worse than al-Qaeda.”
At the operational level, the picture is murkier. Maliki’s drive into Basra appeared precipitous, and Iraqi forces encountered stiffer resistance than they seemed prepared for. But the Iraqis independently massed 30,000 troops in the city, and with our help — especially from the air — inflicted damage on Sadr. If this were to be a climatic battle against Sadr — rather than one in a series of two-steps-forward-one-step-back confrontations — we would have to back Maliki to the utmost, including with ground forces.
The backdrop to events in Basra is the shameful British abdication in the city. Cutting a deal with Sadr, the British evacuated the city last year and repaired to their air base outside the city, where they have been routinely attacked with rockets from radical elements of the Mahdi army and done nothing about it. Not content simply to have retreated from Basra, the British dissembled about the consequence of their exit. They have insisted that things were fine in Basra — even as militias battled for control of the city’s resources and the Iranians steadily increased their influence.
What the British effected in Basra was a version of the Democrats’ preferred strategy of a premature withdrawal on the premise that Iraqis will then sort things out themselves. While the Iraqi government is still weak (as it will be for some time), this sorting out will constitute a competition between armed groups with the Iranians likely benefiting, as we’ve seen in Basra. Although the Brits were content to look the other way, the Iraqi government wasn’t.
Are Maliki’s motives completely pure? Of course not. Sadr is a threat to perform well in the October 1 provincial elections at the expense of Maliki’s Dawa party and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council with which it is allied. The Supreme Council has its own Iranian links and its own private army, the Badr Corps. Maliki is playing favorites by targeting Sadr’s militia. But the Iranian-backed “special groups” of Sadr’s militia have become one of the main threats to peace in the country, ignoring Sadr’s cease-fire that has helped reduce violence in recent months. There can be no long-term stability in Iraq without eventually taking them out.
Whatever the flaws in his execution, Maliki has at least has been displaying a decisiveness that hasn’t been a hallmark of his prime ministership. He is not content to watch the jewel of the Shia south slip out of his government’s control and into the hands of a foreign country. Sunnis can only be heartened that he is standing up to Iran, and acting — his political self-interests aside — in a non-sectarian manner by taking on a Shia group.
On Sunday, Sadr called for a ceasefire, which is what he always does when his forces have been hurt. The history of Sadr’s confrontations with American or Iraqi forces is that he usually takes a beating militarily and/or politically as ordinary people recoil from the resulting disorder. In terms of his political standing, he is a shadow of his former self when he was directing uprisings against the U.S. in 2004. No one can know exactly where this latest episode is headed, but if Sadr stands down, it will be a sign that he is reluctant not just to take on U.S. forces directly, but Iraqi forces as well.
That’s progress. And Nouri al-Maliki now finally might be the ally against Sadr we’ve always wanted him to be.
