This commitment will have consequences. It remains true that Anbar’s leaders are now more reasonable and probably more committed to the political success of Iraq than the Sunni parties in the Council of Representatives. Those parties were chosen at a time when most Iraqi Sunnis really did reject the notion of accepting a lesser role in Iraq, and many Sunni parliamentarians have continued to press for a maximalist version of Sunni aims. Local elections would help, although scheduling them is very complicated for a wide variety of reasons have nothing to do with any putative unwillingness of the Maliki government to “empower” Sunnis, but another event looms on the horizon of greater significance: Iraq will hold new parliamentary elections in 2009. As those elections approach, unreasonable Sunni parliamentarians will face the classic politician’s dilemma: tack more closely to their pragmatic base, or lose their seats to more pragmatic leaders. Either way, it is extraordinarily unlikely that the turn in Anbar will not have a profound effect on the political dynamics of the central government in Baghdad within a few years if not sooner.

Anbar and Shia Mistrust
The Maliki government is unquestionably twitchy about working with many of the Sunni grassroots movements, and with good reason. A lot of the new Sunni volunteers for the ISF were insurgents, and Iraq’s Shia, still traumatized by four years of Sunni attacks, are naturally nervous about taking former insurgents into their security forces. Nevertheless, they are doing so. The creation of the new training center at Habbaniyah, the acceptance of 1,700 Sunni recruits in Abu Ghraib — a very touchy issue because of the proximity of Abu Ghraib to Baghdad — efforts to repair sectarian imbalances within the two Iraqi Army divisions in Anbar itself, the Iraqi government’s acceptance of the establishment of “concerned citizens” groups all around Central Iraq, including in Baghdad, and a variety of other initiatives all indicate a surprising degree of willingness by the current Iraqi government to work and talk with former enemies.

The Sunni, of course, don’t trust the Maliki government any more than it trusts them, and herein lies a key point for American strategy. Right now, American forces are serving as the “honest broker,” the bridge between Sunni and Shia. Both sides trust us more or less, and are willing to work with us; neither trusts the other completely. If we remove this bridge now, it is unlikely that the Iraqis will be able to continue on a path to real reconciliation. But we are working hard every day to help them create their own independent reconciliation structure that will be able to stand on its own. President Bush’s visit to Anbar was a statement. Maliki, Talabani, and Adel Mehdi’s joining him there was a statement. The promise of additional U.S. aid to Anbar is a statement. So is the promise of additional Iraqi aid. This is a process that is ongoing and will take time to work, but it depends unequivocally on the continued presence of American forces and a continued American commitment to Iraq.

Anbar and “My Enemy’s Enemy…”
The Anbaris have certainly not reached out to American forces or the Maliki government because they have suddenly decided that they like us or them. Their turn has been based entirely on self-interest — which is why it is likely to be durable and meaningful. If Anbari leaders were now espousing their longing for Jeffersonian democracy or their enthusiasm for Shia rule, one would have to be highly suspicious of their motives. They are not. They turned toward us initially because they needed allies against AQI. They are joining the ISF rather than working to establish their own militias for similarly self-interested reasons. For instance, the Iraqi Army has always been held in high regard in Iraq and still is, for all its problems. Young Anbaris, who feel defeated by the Americans and the Shia in their quest to regain control of Iraq, need a way to regain honor in Iraqi society. Joining a militia won’t accomplish that goal — we’ve all spent four years telling them that militias are bad. Joining the Iraqi army does accomplish that goal — it gives them an honored place not just in Anbari, but in Iraqi society. It also gives them a reliable paycheck, which offers them the hope of being able to afford to get married, raise children, and so on — armies tend to be much more reliable than militias in this regard. The Anbari leaders are happy for their sons to make these decisions — indeed, are pressing them to do so — because it suits their own self-interest. We support their enlistment, but would oppose the establishment of militias. We promise to reward them with aid and prestige for taking this step, but would censure and dishonor them if they chose the militia path. Reluctant as it might be, the Iraqi government has made clear that it will accept Sunnis in the ISF, but that it will not accept Sunni militias. The wonderful thing about this movement, and the thing that makes it potentially so stable, is that it follows the line of everyone’s self-interest rather than relying upon commitment to ideologies or abstract principles.

Could the Anbaris turn against the U.S.? They might, but they would face a number of problems in doing so. All recruits into the ISF and even into “concerned citizens groups” have to provide U.S. forces with biometric data, including fingerprints and retina scans, and with the serial numbers of their weapons. All of this information strips them of their anonymity — a key asset for insurgents and terrorists. It would make it much easier for U.S. forces to locate turncoats and demonstrate their crimes. And even if they did turn, we would hardly be worse off than before — most of these guys were insurgents, remember. They had been fighting against us; now they’re fighting for us. Even if they turn back, we’re in no worse position than we had been before.

Anbar and the Danger of Civil War
Last is the argument that by “arming” former insurgents U.S. forces are setting the conditions for a terrible civil war if they turn against the Iraqi government at a future date. To begin with, despite a variety of media reports to the contrary, U.S. forces are not arming former insurgents in Iraq. The American command has been explicit and consistent on this point many times, I observed it for myself on a trip at the end of July, and Michael Gordon also addressed it after a longer and more extensive trip from which he recently returned. One of the characteristics of an insurgent is to be armed. By Iraqi law, every household is entitled to possess one AK-47. Almost everyone in Iraq is armed. The last thing former insurgents need is weapons. And, as noted above, not only do we not give them weapons, but we take the serial numbers of the weapons they do have. Whatever else is going on, the U.S. forces are not arming the Sunni in preparation for a civil war.

Nor are we helping them to organize in preparation for fighting such a civil war. Another characteristic of insurgents is that they were already organized to fight. The new organization is based heavily on Iraqi Security Forces and groups partnered with American troops — hardly a solid basis for fighting a sectarian civil war. Finally, if a civil war developed in Iraq — most likely as the result of a premature American withdrawal — does anyone imagine that the Sunni would fail to organize and arm themselves to fight it? On the contrary, by helping the Sunni community establish a legitimate local security force tied into the central government and both supported and advised by American troops, we are helping to establish the basis of long-term stability at the local level. Fear of Shia genocide has been a powerful force behind Sunni rejectionism. Local Sunni security forces help alleviate that fear. Fear of Sunni revanchism has been a strong motivation for Shia intransigence. Incorporating Sunni into the ISF mitigates that fear. Local developments in Anbar and beyond are far more likely to be elements of long-term stability and political progress than to be dangers — as long as the U.S. continues the right strategy.

BACK TO WASHINGTON
Much depends on what America does. Progress in Anbar and throughout the Sunni community has depended heavily on a skillful balance between military force and political efforts at the local level. Neither alone would have been successful, as commanders on the ground readily attest. Stripping the U.S. effort of the forces needed to continue this strategy, as some in Washington and elsewhere are demanding, will most likely destroy the progress already made and lay the groundwork for collapse in Iraq and the destabilization of the region. President Bush clearly understands this fact, as his choice of venue in Iraq demonstrates. We should all understand the significance of the president’s presence in Anbar. With a little good fortune and the continued pursuit of a successful strategy, this visit could well mark a key turning point in the war in Iraq and the war on terror.

— Frederick W. Kagan is a military historian and a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

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