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FEBRUARY 22, 2010, ISSUE   |   VIEW COVER   |   BUY THIS ISSUE   |   SUBSCRIBE TO NR



The Editors

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There’s a presidential election on, so it must be time for another Bob Woodward book about President Bush at war — the hot war in Iraq and the behind-the-scenes struggle with his own generals at home.

The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006-2008 is the fourth Bush-focused expression of the Woodward formula: a well-researched account in which the author’s just-the-facts-ma’am pose cloaks a very decided point of view; much to be taken on faith, because Woodward eschews citations (the better to shield sources); and a bright line separating the guys in the white hats from the villains — a line that coincidentally distinguishes those who have gone out of their way to cooperate with the author from those who haven’t. Pepper the narrative with a few choice leaked defense secrets and you’ve got an instant bestseller.

The chief value of Woodward’s book is in the way it details the mediocrity, prissiness, and willfulness of top military officials, including Gen. George Casey, who commanded U.S. forces while Iraq sank into chaos. Applying what he considered a lesson from Vietnam about the importance of civilians leaving the management of wars to the generals, Bush deferred excessively to Casey and to Gen. John Abizaid, Casey’s immediate superior at Central Command. As the carnage worsened, the generals doggedly pursued their original strategy of drawing down U.S. forces and hastily transferring control to an unprepared Iraqi army — an approach that satisfied neither the security demands in Iraq nor the commander-in-chief’s desire to win.

When challenged, the generals took umbrage. During one videoconference, Bush was at pains to make himself understood: “George, we’re not playing for a tie. I want to make sure we all understand this, don’t we?” Offended, Casey assured the president he wasn’t looking to fight to a draw – but that’s the best possible outcome his approach could have produced. In another instance, National Security Adviser Steve Hadley asked Casey a series of 50 questions about the strategy — on Casey’s birthday no less. Casey considered it an “affront,” according to Woodward. But if you’re a general losing a war, you shouldn’t expect deference.

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